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of the collision. There is a marked pedestrian lane 
running in a northeasterly, southwesterly direction 
across the street and it is contended by the plaintiff that 
she proceeded in the pedestrian lane to the center of the 
highway, then proceeded easterly approximately 45 feet, 
then proceeded in a southeasterly direction toward her 
home which is designated on the map as 937 West 2nd 
South, and that the accident occurred when she was in 
the second traffic lane on the south side of the street. 
Harold A. Peterson, Jr., called as plaintiff's witness 
testified that he investigated the accident as a Salt Lake 
City Police Officer, and made certain measurements at 
the scene. He testified that the left side of the automobile 
was just over, by a matter of inches or a foot of the first 
yellow line south of the center lane at a point 306 feet 
east of the 9th West intersection and 14 feet from the 
south curb and 13 feet from the south center lane of 
traffic, and that there were light scuff marks on the 
street approximately 3 feet from where the automobile 
came to rest (R. 11). He did not recall any blood stains 
on the street, and the injured person had been removed 
by police ambulance prior to the investigation. (R. 12). 
He saw no indications of brake marks. (R. 13). 
W. 0. Cowden. Salt Lake Police Officer testified for 
plaintiff that he investigated the accident with Officer 
Peterson and discussed the accident with the defendant 
at the scene. Tnat defendant told him he would estimate 
that he was approximately 50 feet from the pedestrian 
when he realized the danger first and that he had been 
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traveling 25 miles per hour and his estimated speed at 
the time of impact was one mile per hour; that he had 
just pushed the pedestrian ahead of the automobile (R. 
15). 
Golden J. Bennett, the defendant wa.s called by 
plaintiff as a witness and testified that on the date of 
the accident he was 18 years of age. (R. 18). That he 
was employed at Lang Co. and had left his work shortly 
after 6 :00 o'clock. (R. 19). That upon proceeding from 
his work easterly on West 2nd South, he entered lane 
No. 1 which is the southerly most traffic lane on the 
south side of the street and proceeded in that lane. (R. 
21). 
Q. '' .A.s you hit the intersection, that would 
be the 'vest side of the intersection of 9th West 
and 2nd South Street, how fast were you travel-
ling, ~Ir. Bennett~ 
.... -\... I could not tell you for sure, I was not 
watching my speedometer, but I wasn't going 
very fast. 
Q. What is your best judgment of your speed~ 
A. Oh, 25 miles an hour, maybe 20- 30, some-
where around there." (Tr. 22) 
* * * 
Q. (By l\1r. Beatie) ''Will you mark that 
please, then, let's mark it 'D 1' the position. Now 
when you \vere at point 'D 1' \viii you mark on the 
diagram ''There Mrs. Smith was, please, Mr. Ben-
nett u! 
A. vVell, 'vhen I first saw Mrs. Smith it 
seemed to me like she \vas walking into these 
yello'v lines right approximately here. 
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Q. Just mark that then with a rircle, say, and 
mark that '8'. No'Y "~hen you \Yere at point 'B 1' 
and you observed ~frs. Smith at point '8', how 
fast was your car traYelling ·1 
A. ..A.pproximately 25 miles an hour." 
* * * 
Q. Between point '' B 1 '' and the "\\rest edge 
of the cross \Valk marked upon Exhibit B, did you 
reduce your speed by applying your brakes at any 
point 1 
A. Yes. (R. 25) 
Q. (By lvir. Beatie) Now will you tell me, Mr. 
Bennett, how far west of the \Yest line of the cross 
walk point '' B 1 '' is in your best judgment. 
A. I could not tell you for sure, I do not kno\v 
the distance from the cross,valk to the map here. 
I imagine it was 50 or 75 feet, something like 
that. (R. 26) 
Q. I want to kno\v ,,·hat your judgment is of 
where you first observed her starting to run 
across the street and at what point on the south 
portion of the highway were you at that time. 
A. I first observc<l her \Yhen she started to 
run across the street approximately right here. 
Q. You are indicating in the a rea of "S 4 ", is 
that correct~ 
A. That is correct. (R. 31) 
Q. Will you make below '' B f)'' then, please, 
25-30 feet'~ Now at point "B 5" ho"· fast were 
you travelling, ~Ir. Bennett. 
A. I have no idea, sir. .A.t that point I had 
already slo,ved down for 1\frs. Smith once and I 
thought I had the right of "·ay. (R. 32) 
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Q. .A.Jld \Ya~ she walking at all times between 
point '' S 1'' and '' S 4'' in a southeasterly direc-
tion? 
A. \V ell she stopped when I honked my horn, 
you see, she "'"as then at point "S 4". 
Q. She "~as then at a point "S 4", is that 
correct, ,,,.hen you honked your horn~ 
~l. .A.pproximately, yes. (R. 36) 
THE COURT: From the time you honked 
your horn until she started to run in front of your 
car as you say she did, how far did you travel~ 
THE \VITNESS : Approximately 25 or 30 
feet, maybe, I don't know. (R. 37) 
Q. (By Mr. Beatie) J\1r. Bennett, would you 
say that as you haYe diagrammed here at point 
"B 5" that you travelled a distance then of 25 to 
30 feet while Mrs. Smith ran 13 feet, is that 
correct~ 
A. Well, sir, I don't know, that is just an ap-
proximate diagram I put there. I have no meas-
urements or anything to go by there, I don't 
know. (R. 38) 
Q. No\v let me ask you from point ''B 5'' on 
the Exhibit B did your car vary in its path from 
that point to the point of impact~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Very much~ 
A. I just turned a little. 
Q. In which "~ay did it turn f 
A. It turned right a little, it skidded right a 
little. 
Q. Skidded right f 
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A. Yes, kind of. (R. 40) 
Ross J. Smith, the husband of plaintiff testified: 
Q. And it is your best estimate it is bet,veen 
80 and 85 feet east of the east side of the cross 
walk to- the point at which you first found your 
wife's body. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now ho\v could you identify that particular 
spot, or \vas there anything that would indicate 
what that spot was \vhen you first arrived there. 
A. You mean when I first got out to the scene 
of the accident' 
Q. Yes, the scene of the accident. 
A. There was a puddle of blood on the end 
of the white line. (R. 53) 
Plaintiff testified in her behalf that she had resided 
at 937 West 2nd South for about seven years and had 
been employed at the \Vestern Co-op for about ten ~Tears 
as a cashier (R. 61). That plaintiff has never had any 
injuries to her body of any kind but has \vorn glasses 
since she \vas about 20 years old~ that she is no\v 55 
years of age and had not had a doctor in atte11dancc in 
the last ten years. (R. 62) ; that on the eYPlling of the 
accident she came out of the Western Co-op "Tith a fello\v 
employee, l\{rs. Ostberg and l\fr. \Vright, her employPr 
was at the door and saw' her \Valk easterly from the 
entrance of the Western Co-op to the driYe\vay \vith 
Mrs. Ostberg. (R. 53). 
Q. Take the pencil so ~·ou eau mark it from 
\\rhere you left ~[r~. Osther~ and \vhat path you 
took in going home. 
() 
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A. I left Mrs. Ostberg here by the truck and 
I came do,vn here and come down here to the 
curbing. 
Q. All right. Now at the curbing let me ask 
you this. ~-\ t the curbing did you make any ob-
servation of traffic on 2nd South Street' 
.A.. I looked eastvlard. (R. 64) 
Q. Did you look 'vest at all' 
A. No, sir. 
Q. What did you observe as far as your traffic 
was concerned toward the east' 
A. There \Vas a car coming. 
Q. How you any opinion as to how far the 
car '""as R\vay ~ 
A. It \Yas up toward 8th West. 
Q. Now where did you go from the point you 
were at the curbing, Mrs. Smith' 
A. I came across-
Q. Just make a mark with the pencil. 
A. I came in through here and came to the 
center lane where the yellow line is in the middle. 
Q. At that particular point did you make any 
observation of the traffic on 2nd South Street~ 
A. I stopped there, sir, and looked west. 
Q. Which \vay did you look~ 
A. Westward, sir. 
Q. What did you observe in reference to the 
traffic situation 'vest of you on 2nd South Street 
at that point' Was a car or cars coming down the 
streetf 
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A. A car "\vas coming \vay down the street. 
Q. N O\Y \vhen you say "'"ay do\vn the street, 
which way1 
A. Almost to lOth West. 
Q. What next did you do '1 
A. Then after I stopped there I walked up-
Q. Just mark with the pencil where you 
walked. 
A. I \valked up this yellow line in through here. 
Q. Now have you any opinion as to how far 
you walked from the point in the center of the 
street in an easterly direction J ( R. 65) 
A. I guess about 45 feet. 
Q. You had proceeded from a point in the 
cross \valk in an easterly direction, I understand, 
between the yellow line easterly a bout 45 feet Y 
A. That's right. (R. 66) 
Q. 1\tirs. Smith, the last question asked last 
night was, was the white apron, a portion of the 
butcher's apron which you had on clear around 
your body below the hips, and the answer was 
"Yes". It is my impression that the previous 
position at which that question \vas asked, \va.s 
that you were in the center of the street, between 
the marked lines, east of the crosswalk; is that 
correct1 
A. Yes. 
Q. No\v then, yon \vere at that position which 
you have said in your judgment \vas approxi-
mately 45 feet east, bet\\·ecn the marked center 
line, did you make any observation of traffi<' to 
the west which 'vould he coming easterly 1 
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A. Before I crossed the street I stopped and 
looked. 
Q. N O\Y, l\1rs. Smith, will you just listen to 
the question, please and we will get along faster. 
When you were in the center lines, you had gone 
45 feet east; I understand you to say you stopped~ 
~l. I did, sir. 
Q. All right. When you were at that portion 
of the highway between the lines, when you came 
to the stop, did your observe the condition of 
traffic on the south portion of West Second South 
Street1 
A. There \Yas n car-parked cars west of 9th 
West. (R. 102) 
Q. Was there any other traffic that you ob-
served on the south portion of 2nd South~ 
A. There \Yasn 't anything bet,veen 9th West 
and ,,,.here I \vas. 
Q. \:Vhat next did you do~ Withdra\v that. 
Did you leave that particular point after having 
made that observation~ 
.A. Yes. 
Q. What did you do~ 
A_. I sa-vv the car down there, and started to 
cross the street. 
Q. Which \vay did you walk~ 
A. I walked over to the south side. 
Q. Did you run at all~ 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. Well you -vvere there; did you walk or did 
you run~ 
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A. Well I have al\Yays "~alked rather quickly. 
Q. Which direction did ~vou w·alk? 
A. I walked south. 
Q. Why were you \valking in that direction, 
Mrs. Smith~ 
1\. Because my home is just there. (R. 103) 
Q. (By Mr. Beatie) Now "Then you say, 1\tirs. 
Smith, that you were proceeding to,vard your 
home, in what general direction 'vere you walk-
ing from the center lines of West 2nd South 
Street~ 
A. South-southeast to my home. 
Q. Now how far did you walk from the renter 
cross lines on the south portion of 2nd South 
Street1 
A. I \Vas in the center one-in the second line. 
(R. 105) 
Q. Which Jane were you in 1 
A. Lane 1. 
Q. You were in Lane 1? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What happened, if anything1 
A. .AJl I can remember is that I heard an 
awful grinding noise and it felt like my body \Vas 
whirling around, nud I hit. r_rhat is all. ('l"r. 106) 
The witness then described in detail tht) uaturP of 
her injuries and the places in her body \\·hieh \rere in-
jured and the pain and suffering shP still has. (H .. 12£-i). 
10 
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CROSS EXAMINATION 
Q. ~[rs. Smith, as I understand your testi-
mony, you said that when you got about 45 feet 
east of the center of the street, east of the center 
of the pedestrian lane, and center of the street, 
that you looked to,vard the 'vest; is that right f 
..._-\. \~ es. 
Q. 1\..nd then yon started across the street~ 
...._~. Yes. 
Q. --._\nd were you 'valking fast or hurrying, as 
you 'Yent across the street, or running f 
A. I walked, the 'vay I have always walked. I 
didn't 'Yalk slowly, sir. 
Q. Well, did you walk faster than you usually 
did? 
. A. No ; faster than I do now. I cannot walk 
as fast ; faster than I do now. 
Q. Would it be fair to say, Mrs. Smith, that 
the last time you-that your testimony in court is, 
that the last time you looked to the west was when 
you were in the center of the street, at this point 
45 feet east of the pedestrian lane f 
A. I looked there before I started crossing the 
street. 
Q. Then you walked southwesterly across the 
· first lane of traffic~ 
_A. Wouldn't be southwest, -my home. 
Q. Southeasterly-! mean southeasterly. You 
walked southeasterly toward your homef Is that 
right'? (R. 126) 
.i\.. Yes. 
11 
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Q. So you walked from the center line here, 
to the point ''There the impact occurred, "Tithout 
looking back again~ 
.1\._. I can't say "rhether I happened to look 
that way again or not. It is too long ago for me to 
remember. (Tr. 127) 
Ed,vin W. Wright testified for the plaintiff as fol-
lows: 
Q. Now \vill you just tell the court and the 
jury please, \vhat you observed from that par-
ticular position, 1[r. \Vright, on that night! 
A. The first thing that happened, that I paid 
any attention to, 'vas a serious screeching of some 
automobile brakes, and then that stopped. It 
stopped as if it had hit, or probably· he going to 
hit something or someone, and I \\Tent oYer to,vard 
that direction, and there on the ground, about, oh 
I would say 15 or 20 feet from the south sidewalk, 
'vas my employe there, lying on the ground, and 
her head was bleeding on the rear, and she called 
for her glasses. Somebody had them and she got 
them. And I stayed there a few minutes, and then 
I went back to my place of business. 
Q. Now at any time from your point of obser-
vation, from '"here you were at Western Co-op, 
did you hear any warning signal given, such as a 
horn honk or anything, immediately prior to the 
screeching of the brakes. 
A. No, sir. (R. 97) 
Helen Ostberg testified for the plaintiff as follo"'S: 
Q. What next did you hear or observe there 
that evening~ 
A. Well I was half in the truek, a rlosed-panel 
truck, and I heard a loud noise, so I drew back, 
12 
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to see "'"hat it 'vas, and at that time I saw a body 
about t\\~'O or three feet in the air, and it then 
rolled along the pavement, much like a sack of 
potatoes, and gave the resemblance somebody had 
fallen out of a. car-really (R. 99) rolled quite 
fast. 
Frank W. Bonner, testified for the plaintiff that he 
witnessed the accident at a point about 75 feet east of 
the cross walk. (R. 134). 
Q. Then you only noted her in the center of 
the street first 1 ; had she ever crossed before you 
-let's start again. She crossed the street then 
in front of your car; is that correct' 
A. That is right. 
Q. And was she walking or what you say be-
tween a walk and a trot' 
A. She was hurrying. 
Q. So you were how many feet east of her 
'vould you say when she left the center of the 
street' 
A. I imagine about 40 feet by that time, -40 
or 50 feet. 
Q. And did she continue right on as she passed 
the center line on the south portion of the high-
way1 
A. She hesitated. 
Q. She hesitated 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what do you mean by ''hesitated''? 
(R. 137) 
A. I don't know what anybody would stop in 
the middle of the road for unless to look. 
Q. Would you say then she just hesitated and 
looked and started ·off again; is that it1 
13 
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A. Yes. 
Q. Now at the time she hesitated in the center 
of the street, did you observe any car coming 
east, Mr. Bonner~ 
A. Yes. (R. 138) 
Q. Now while this particular car came in an 
easterly direction, which you observed with two 
lights, did you follow it to know that it was the 
Bennett car and the one involved in the accident? 
A. I seen Mr. Bennett hit the object. 
Q. And from the point which you have initialed 
here, as being west of the crosswalk, did that car 
vary at all from one lane to another as it ap-
proached in an easterly direction? 
A. Well, it seemed like it wanted to go just a 
little bit to the number 2 lane, and then it switched 
back in,-not too much. I was slowing down at 
the time. I had a feeling something was going to 
happen; something just told me something was 
going to happen. (R. 139). 
Q. Did you hear the honking of a horn just 
before the accident happened~ 
A. No. 
* * • 
Q. And do you have any estimation of how 
fast he was traveling before the impact of his 
automobile~ 
A. I was going west, and it is pretty hard for 
me to judge. I thought maybe bet,veen 30 and 
maybe a little faster; not much. Maybe I might 
be "·roug there too. It is hard to tell which way 
you are going, and hO\\' fast n man is going inside 
of your O\Yn car. (R. 140) 
14 
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Q. Then from that position in which these left 
""'heels were five feet, he then cut back into Lane 
No. 1; is that correct 1 
A. That is right. 
Q. Now will you just mark from this mark 
here, where he cut back into Lane No. 1 ~ Will 
you just draw it to the best of your ability~ 
.. A.. He just started in a little, and came back 
into here, you know, in this vicinity here; he 
straighte~ed up. (R. 145) 
Charles Henry Sweat testified for the plaintiff as 
follows: 
Q. She was bleeding from the head~ 
A. Yes, there was a little blood there, I noticed. 
Q. Did you observe any particular marks on 
it-traffic marks on it-from the Bennett car? 
A. Yes, I noticed his brake. 
Q. In other worqs, as we call it-burning 
rubber; did you notice any marks from his burn-
ing rubber just prior to the accident~ 
A. Yes, I did. I noticed that, the length he 
skidded. I noticed that. 
Q. How far would you estimate that was, Mr. 
. Sweat; was it west of the crosswalk~ The brake 
marks~ 
A. No, definitely right against the woman, 
right close to the woman. As a matter of fact, the 
time I heard the brakes 'vas the time I saw the 
collision; I don't know if he applied his brakes at 
the time the impact was. (R. 155) 
15 
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At the conclusion of the evidence for plaintiff Rex 
J. Hanson, attorney for defendant, made a motion for 
a non -suit. The Court then stated : 
THE COURT: "Members of the Jury in this 
case it is the opinion of the Court that the plaintiff 
was contributorily negligent in two respects ; in 
failing to keep a proper lookout for vehicles, and 
also in depriving the defendant-driver of the 
right-of-way." (R. 161) 
"In that event, the pedestrian is obligated to 
yield the right-of-way to the vehicle. In this case, 
that observation was not made and that would 
have to be a failure to observe because the vehicle 
was there, where it would reach that point at the 
same time as the pedestrian. However, the pedes-
trian did not observe it, and the only way that 
you could say that the vehicle did not have the 
right-of-way, would be to say he was solfar back 
he was traveling at a high rate of speed, and the 
pedestrian could not observe it. 
'' There is some evidence of speed here, and 
some conflicting evidence. The evidence might be 
sufficient to show negligence on the part of the 
defendant, in which event we would have to decide, 
but I do not think the evidence is sufficient to 
Rhow that the automobile did not have the right-
of-,vay." (R. 163) 
Mr. Rex J. Hanson then withdrew his motion for 
non-suit and made a motion for a directed verdict whieh 
was granted and a verdict signed by the foremall of the 
Jury. 
16 
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STATEMENT OF POINT RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A 
VERDICT THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY 
OF NEGLIGENCE AS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF 
THE ACCIDENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN DIRECTING A 
VERDICT THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY 
OF NEGLIGENCE AS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF 
THE ACCIDENT. 
In Hess v. Robinson, (Utah) 163 Pac. (2d) 510. 
Justice Larson said at page 512: 
"As to what the circumstances were at the 
time plaintiff entered the intersection, and as to 
whether entering under such circumstances was 
an act from which a person of ordinary prudence 
and caution would have foreseen that some injury 
'vould likely result, are matters upon which reas-
onable minds may differ. As such they are 
properly for the jury. Proximate cause and con-
tributory negligence are ordinarily questions of 
fact for the jury to determine under all the cir-
cumstances. (Citing Cases). Questions of negli-
gence do not become questions of law for court 
except where the facts are such that all reasonable 
I . * * * men draw the same cone us1ons. 
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"Since in this cause there is a. question as to 
what were the circumstances existing when plain-
tiff entered the intersection, and where those cir-
cumstances may be found by the trier of the fact 
to be such that reasonable men might differ as to 
whether plaintiff's conduct in entering the inter-
section was such as an ordinarily prudent and 
careful man might do under the circumstances, 
there was a question for the jury as to whether 
plaintiff's negligence was contributory, that is, 
was the proximate cause of the injury. '' 
In Hickok v. Skinner, CU:tah) 190 Pac. (2d) 514. 
Justice Wolfe said at page 519: 
"Even if it be conceded that plaintiff was con-
tributorily negligent as a matter of la\v, the ques-
tion of whether or not such negligence was a sub-
stantial causative factor in producing the collision 
was one of fact. Even if plaintiff had taken a 
second or third look, such might not have revealed 
to him that defendant would not yield the right-
of-way to him, until too late for plaintiff to avert 
the accident. This case is somewhat similar to 
Hess v. Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 P. (2d) 510. 
In that case plaintiff was driving on a through 
highway and did not see the defendant's ambu-
lance approaching from the right. The ambulance 
went through the stop sign and crashed into plain-
tiff's automobile. The trial court held both parties 
negligent as a matter of law, but submitted the 
case to the jury on the question of whether or not 
plaintiff's contributory negligence was a proxi-
mate cause of the damage. From a verdict and 
judg1nent for plaintiff, defendants appealed. We 
affirmed. Although the court divided on thP ques-
tion of \\·hcther or not plaintiff 'vas guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of la,v, \VP 
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agreed unanimously that the question of proxi-
mate cause "~as one for the jury. I recognize that 
the facts of this case are somewhat different from 
those in the Hess case, but the underlying reason-
ing should be the same.'' 
In H~tnter v. Michaelis, (Utah) 198 Pac. (2d) 245. 
Justice Wolfe said at pa.ge 253: 
''I am also in accord with the view that it is a 
jury question as to whether the plaintiff exercised 
due care in keeping a lookout while she was cross-
ing the street and whether she gave sufficient re-
appraisals of the traffic approaching from the 
"\vest as she was proceeding across. _That is what 
I contended for in Hickok v. Skinner, Utah, 190 
P. (2d) 514." 
Justice Latimer said at page 254: 
''As I interpret the California decisions and 
analyze the reasoning of this court in the Hickok 
v. Skinner case, supra, I come to the conclusion 
that under the law in both jurisdictions the trial 
judge was right when he refused to direct a ver-
dict against plaintiff based on the principle that 
she was guilty of negligence as a matter of law.'' 
In Martin v. Stevens, (Utah) 243 Pac. (2d) page 746. 
Justice Crockett at page 7 49 said : 
''The question of contributory negligence is 
usually for the jury and the court should be re-
luctant to take consideration of this question of 
fact from it. Nielson v. Mauchley, Utah, 202 P. 
(2d) 547; Toomer's Estate v. Union Pacific Rail-
road Co., Utah, 239 P. (2d) 163. The expressions 
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in those cases are in accord with this uniformly 
accepted doctrine. The right to trial by jury 
should be safeguarded. Before the issue of con-
tributory negligence may be taken from the jury, 
the defendant's burden of proving both (a) that 
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, 
and (b) that such negligence proximately con-
tributed to cause his own injury, must be met, and 
established with such certainty that reasonable 
minds could not find to the contrary; conversely, 
if there is any reasonable basis, either because of 
lack of evidence, or from the evidence and the fair 
inferences arising therefrom, taken in the light 
most favorable to plaintiff, upon which reasonable 
minds may conclude that they are not convinced 
by a preponderance of the evidence either (a) that 
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence or 
(b) that such negligence proximately contributed 
to cause the injury, the plaintiff is entitled to haYe 
the question submitted to a jury.'' 
In Gibbs v. Blue Cab, Inc., (Utah) 249 Pac. (2d) 213. 
Justice Henriod at page 215 of the opinion said : 
''Assuming that in one aspect, by showing a 
violation of the city ordinance, defendant estab-
lished some negligence .on the part of deceased as 
a matter of law, the problem remains as to 
whether absence of the lamp under all the facts 
was or was not a contributing proximate cause of 
the collision,-particularly in view of the faet that 
immediately prior to the time of impact the bi-
cycle, and therefore the lamp, was pointed away 
from the vision of the defendant-a proper jury 
question. 
"We are committed to the principle that Dlat-
ters of neo·li O'PJH'C' contributory IH ·gli u·ence and ~ ~ ' • M 
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proximate cause generally are jury questions, un-
less the evidentiary facts are of such conclusive 
character as to require all reasonable minds to 
conclude that the ultimate fact of negligence, con-
tributory negligence or proximate cause does or 
does not exist. Recognizing the rule that the trial 
court's conclusions will remain undisturbed un-
less clearly arbitrary, we believe that application 
to this case of the principles mentioned, being the 
only practical yardstick applicable in intersection 
cases, compels us to disagree with the trial court's 
conclusions.'' 
In Stickle v. Union Pacific R. Co., (Utah) 251 Pac. 
(2d) 867. 
Justice Crockett said at page 870: 
''The authorities frequently state that the 
question of contributory negligence is usually for 
the jury. And that this is so wherever the evidence 
is such that reasonable minds may differ as to its 
existence ha.s been stated innumerable times, 
which is undoubtedly correct. However, in view 
of the fact that before the issue may be taken from 
the jury, the defendant has the burden of estab-
lishing plaintiff's negligence by a preponderance 
of the evidence it may be a bit more ;precise to 
state that the question of contributory negligence 
is for the jury whenever the evidence is such that 
jurors, acting fairly and reasonably, may say that 
they are not convinced by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence 
which proximately contributed to cause his own 
. . InJury. 
"It should be kept in mind that so far as the 
quantum of proof necessary to take the question 
of contributory negligence from the jury is con-
cerned, the tests are the same as with respect to 
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primary negligence. For instance, in a given case, 
there may be some evidence upon which a finding 
of negligence by the defendant could be based, yet 
the jury may remain in such a state of mind that 
they may fairly say that they are not convinced 
by preponderance of the evidence that the de-
fendant was negligent, and based upon such fail-
ure of proof may refuse to find a verdict against 
him. It would only be when the defendant's negli-
gence had been established with such certainty 
that all reasonable care, that the court would rule 
as a matter of law that he was negligent and 
direct the jury to find a verdict against him; con-
versely, if evidence were such that reasonable 
men may fairly say that they are not convinced 
from a preponderance of the evidence, that he was 
guilty of negligence, the court could not rule that 
he was negligent as a matter of law and take the 
case from the jury. 
"These principles apply in identical fashion 
to the question of plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence except that the defendant has the burden of 
proof. That the evidence is such that the jury 
may find from a preponderance of the evidence 
that the plaintiff failed to use due care for his o"\\rn 
safety is not sufficient. The proof must establish 
his failure to do so with such certainty that all 
reasonable minds must so conclude before the 
court may rule as a matter of law that he is pre-
cluded from recovery on that ground. The court 
should exercise caution and forebearance in con-
sidering taking questions of fact from the jury.'' 
In Morby v. Rogers, (Utah) 252 Pac. (2d) ~31. 
Justice l\IcDonough at page 232-3 said : 
''Reasonable minds, however, "\\ronld be justi-
fied in inferring nt•gligencP on thP part of de-
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fendant from circumstantial physical facts also 
brought out in the record. For example the lack 
of skid or brake marks would justify an inference 
against defendant's purported ''quick action'' to 
avoid the accident. The final position of the auto-
mobile in the canal would justify a finding that 
defendant 'vas traveling faster than his testimony 
indicated and that such speed indicated his lack 
of control over the automobile at the time of the 
accident. Furthermore, the testimony in regard 
to the boy's injuries would justify a finding that 
the deceased was struck with great force and was 
not ''just tipped over'' as defendant and his wife 
testified. The fact that extent of injury to the 
bicycle consisted of a damaged rear mud guard 
and that there was no injury to the front of the 
bicycle would justify a finding that the boy did 
not turn into defendant as was contended, but 
rather was struck from behind. In addition to 
this reasonable minds could find from the point of 
impact and the position of deceased's body that 
the boy had not made any sudden turn but had 
gradually veered over onto the west portion of 
the highway before he was struck. 
"It is not a new or novel principle that acts of 
negligence may be proved by circumstances. Cer-
tainly, in many cases, particularly where the only 
eye witnesses are parties having an interest in 
the action, such circumstances are the only means 
by which certain facts may be valuated by the 
jury in whose province lies the power to believe 
or disbelieve the testimony of the witnesses, and 
to draw such reasonable conclusions from the 
whole record as may be warranted. 
''We are of the opinion that reasonable minds 
could find negligence on the part, of the defendant 
from the evidence in the record. The trial court 
therefore did not err in letting the question of 
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defendant's negligence go to the jury under the 
evidence. ' ' 
ARGUMENT 
It is respectfully contended that it is a jury question 
as to whether or not the plaintiff exercised due care in 
keeping a lookout while she was crossing the street and 
whether she gave sufficient reappraisals of the traffic 
approaching from the west as she was proceeding across 
the street. 
The Judge, even in his statement in which he.directed 
the verdict, admitted that there was some conflicting evi-
dence of the speed of the vehicle which of necessity '\\!ould 
make this a jury question. Further, the circumstantial 
evidence is conflicting as to whether or not the plaintiff 
was merely bumped and tipped over or whether she wa.s 
thrown through the air, a further conflict of warning by 
horn and a conflict of brake marks, all of which were to 
be determined by the triers of the fact and therefore was 
a jury question. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Court erred in 
this matter in directing a verdict against the plaintiff 
and invaded the province of the jury in so ruling. 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. D. BEATIE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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